A well-designed computer network, like well-designed policy in a federation like Canada, depends on good firewalls. In a computer network, a good firewall alerts users to potential harmful interactions between the computer and the local network, and also between the local network and the Internet. Similarly, policy in a federation works better when firewalls limit potentially harmful intrusions by higher or external governments, or between governments and transnational organizations. 

Good firewalls do not prevent any and all interaction — rather, they limit unwanted intrusions that have the potential to cause damage. Firewalls can be configured to allow healthy interaction with networks and other computers (e-mail, surfing, exchanging files with known parties), but they also alert the computer user or network — usually via a pop-up window — of anything unpleasant. 

For example, my home has a network of two computers — one for the kids and one for the adults. A first firewall alerts me when the network tries to access my files or tries to use my computing power for, say, a resource-intensive game that the kids are playing. I can accept or reject the intrusions with the click of my mouse based on my assessment of whether the intrusion will slow or crash my system. 

A second firewall alerts me to intrusions from outside my network — usually the Internet. Again, I can accept or reject these intrusions based on whether they are regular interactions (e-mail, surfing known Web sites), whether I initiated the action (downloading software), or whether some external user or program is trying to search my files (this is how MP3 databanks are created). 

These firewalls do not prevent regular interactions because the firewall can be configured to allow certain programs to operate freely within certain confines (I have access to my kids’ computer, but they do not have free access to mine). 

Similar firewalls can be established between provincial and federal governments and between governments and external parties. The new panel to mediate health-care disputes between Ottawa and the provinces is similar to the firewall between my computer and the network. It will prevent Ottawa’s unilateral encroachment into provincial health policy — as it should, because the constitutional configuration gives control over health policy to the provinces. 

Prior to the establishment of the panel, the federal government reserved the right to punish a province for anything that it deemed to be a violation of the Canada Health Act. In other words, there was no effective firewall to prevent Ottawa from freely invading and changing provincial health policy. This firewall will not prevent mutually beneficial exchanges between Ottawa and the provinces on health care. However, any dispute referred to the panel (the policy equivalent of a pop-up window) gives the province an opportunity to determine whether the intrusion is benign, or whether it might slow or crash the provincial health-care system. 

Another example is the Kyoto program. In this case, both federal and provincial firewalls have been active. The federal government has been hesitant to allow the Kyoto program to operate in Canada unless it can get credits for natural gas sold to the United States and elsewhere. The fact that the federal Cabinet appears to be fighting over the mouse does not diminish the fact that firewalls at the federal level are effective at screening policy initiatives from transnational organizations such as the UN, WTO and IMF as well as other nations, particularly the United States. 

If Ottawa allows Kyoto past its firewall, the program will face another firewall — a pop-up window will appear in each province. Provinces can accept the intrusion by agreeing to jointly pass legislation to meet the Kyoto commitments. Or provinces can decide that the Kyoto program will result in a less than optimal operation of a province (or even a crash) and thereby refuse to allow it entry. Again, this is as it should be since the Canadian Constitution is configured to give provinces and the federal government joint jurisdiction over environmental policy. 

Policy firewalls, like their computer counterparts, will not prevent any and all action on the part of Ottawa if properly (and constitutionally) configured. In the area of interprovincial trade, for example, the constitutional configuration allows Ottawa to freely intrude — the Constitution prohibits barriers to the free flow of goods, services and people across the country. That Ottawa has been reluctant to eliminate attempts to hamper such flows is not an argument against firewalls, but rather reflects a lack of will to work with the current constitutional configuration. 

Good policy in a federation like Canada depends on good firewalls. Constitutionally configured firewalls can promote useful interaction between levels of government and the outside world while at the same time providing a useful tool for managing unwarranted or potentially damaging intrusions into domestic or provincial policies. As the recent developments in health-care and Kyoto files illustrate, well-designed policy depends on well-designed firewalls not only between the provinces and Ottawa, but also between Ottawa and the world wide web of governments and other transnational institutions.